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Regulatory supportThe Global Action Plan (GAP) for Influenza Vaccines is a decade-long initiative that brings together a
diverse range of stakeholders to work towards reducing anticipated global shortage of influenza vaccines
and ensuring more equitable access to vaccines during the next influenza pandemic. Since its inception in
2006, significant progress has been made towards all the main objectives of GAP, namely: (1) an increase
in seasonal vaccine use, (2) an increase in vaccine production, and (3) progress in research and develop-
ment of more effective vaccines. The Technology Transfer Initiative (TTI), conceived and managed by
WHO under the GAP, contributed to increasing regional influenza vaccine production capacity. This
was achieved by facilitating technology transfer in 14 low- and middle-income countries, through grants
to manufacturers to establish or strengthen influenza vaccine production capacity and support to their
national regulatory authorities. Five of the countries subsequently licensed locally produced influenza
vaccines; two pandemic and three seasonal vaccines received WHO prequalification. The success of
GAP can be largely attributed to the regulatory support provided by WHO to both manufacturers and reg-
ulators. This support had two components: (1) direct regulatory support to GAP/TTI, and (2) support to
GAP-related WHO programmes, such as the Pandemic Influenza Vaccine Deployment Initiative in 2010
and the Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Framework since 2013, especially in non-vaccine-producing
countries. Temporary adaptation of the assessment process for influenza vaccines in the WHO Vaccine
Prequalification Programme to the A(H1N1) pandemic situation in 2009 was instrumental to the success
of the WHO Pandemic Influenza Vaccine Deployment Initiative in its attempt to meet the demand for
pandemic vaccines in countries that received donated vaccines.
 2016 Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creative-
commons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Vaccine regulation, as an integral part of regulation of medici-
nes in general, aims to ensure that vaccines offered to the public
to prevent disease are safe and effective. Activities cover all stages
of vaccine development and marketing, from early development,
through marketing and post-marketing authorization, to the per-
manent removal of the product from the market. Regulatory sup-
port has been essential to the success of the Global Action Plan
(GAP) for Influenza Vaccines, the subject of this special issue of
Vaccine. The GAP is a multi-stakeholder, multi-partner initiative
aimed at ensuring that populations throughout the world can be
protected through vaccination in the event of an influenza pan-demic. This paper provides an overview of the regulatory contribu-
tions of the World Health Organization (WHO) to GAP since the
Plan’s inception in 2006.
Vaccines are generally regulated by national jurisdictions,
although in some areas supranational regulatory oversight has
recently emerged, e.g. in the European Union. National regulatory
authorities (NRAs) are the principal executors of vaccine
regulation.
WHO is not itself a regulatory agency for vaccines or any other
medicines. However, by bringing together strategic stakeholders
from around the world, the Organization plays an important cat-
alytic role in promoting convergence in the field of vaccine regula-
tion. The GAP is a good example of how the continuous adaptation
of the global regulatory milieu to sudden challenges, such as the
emerging avian influenza threats, is instrumental in controlling
disease outbreaks. It is widely accepted that regulators with mul-
tiple regulatory pathways in place now are better prepared to face
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initiatives, such as the GAP, WHO has played an important role
in promoting this positive development.2. WHO and the biannual production of seasonal influenza
vaccines
The causative virus of human influenza disease was discovered
in the early 1930s by Smith et al. [1]. Soon after the discovery,
attempts were made to develop influenza vaccines and over the
next three decades both inactivated and live attenuated vaccines
were marketed and used in annual vaccination campaigns in many
regions of the world. Active immunization is the main public
health weapon in reducing morbidity and mortality due to influen-
za. Because of the ever-evolving nature of the influenza virus,
immunization needs to be carried out every year in seasonal
campaigns.
A periodic relicensing process has been established by regula-
tors to meet this yearly challenge. The manufacturing logistics of
influenza vaccines are complex. The rapid spread of drifting influ-
enza viruses during and between epidemics represents a continu-
ous challenge for timely production of a vaccine that antigenically
matches the circulating virus. Two sets of influenza vaccine are
manufactured in each 12-month period, distinguished as northern
and southern hemisphere vaccines. Following a highly complex,
time-sensitive preparatory process, which involves a wide range
of technical contribution from five continents in a WHO-
coordinated effort, the vaccines are produced in a race against time
[2,3].
The preparatory process consists of three steps:
(1) selection of vaccine virus strains;
(2) development of high-yield candidate vaccine viruses,
through either classical reassortment methods or reverse
genetics technology;
(3) preparation of vaccine potency reagents.
Since 1973, WHO has made formal recommendations for the
composition of influenza vaccines, based on the information pro-
vided by the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance and Response Sys-
tem. High-yield candidate vaccine viruses are then developed in
WHO collaborating centres and selected independent laboratories,
and distributed to manufacturers. For final formulation and lot
release of the vaccine, the necessary reference reagents are devel-
oped by WHO essential regulatory laboratories, with active contri-
butions from the vaccine industry as the antigen source [4]. This
well established framework has ensured a steady, well balanced
regulatory environment for influenza vaccines over many years.
Apart from a relatively minor revision in 1990, the WHO regulatory
guidance documents for inactivated and live attenuated influenza
vaccine remained unchanged from the late 1970s until the mid-
2000s [5–7].3. Regulatory challenges and the inception of the GAP
Around the turn of the century, a public health emergency arose
that threatened both human and veterinary health. The apparent
threat of an imminent influenza pandemic of devastating propor-
tions and an anticipated case-fatality rate potentially over 50% dra-
matically changed public perceptions. The effects inevitably spilled
over into the regulatory arena.
It started in 1997, with the first-ever reported outbreak of A
(H5N1) avian influenza in humans in Hong Kong [8,9]. The out-
break was halted through the territory-wide slaughter of millionsof chickens and additional control measures [10,11]. However,
the global public health alert level remained high, mainly because
of three factors: the extremely high case-fatality rate observed
during the outbreak; the anticipated shortfall of billions of doses
of vaccine in the event of a pandemic; and the lower than expected
immunogenicity observed in candidate pre-pandemic A(H5N1)
vaccines [12,13].
Following six years of silence, human infections due to A(H5N1)
were again seen in 2003. Since then, a total of 850 laboratory-
confirmed human cases, causing 449 deaths, have been reported
from 16 countries in Asia, Africa and Europe [14].
In view of the threat of an influenza pandemic, and in response
to two World Health Assembly (WHA) resolutions, the GAP was
initiated in late 2006 [15]. ResolutionWHA56.19 in 2003 requested
that seasonal influenza vaccine coverage should be increased. Res-
olution WHA58.5 (2005) requested the WHO Secretariat to seek
ways to reduce the global shortage of influenza vaccines for both
epidemics and pandemics, including vaccination strategies that
economize on the use of antigens.
This comprehensive multi-stakeholder initiative, originally
known as Global pandemic influenza action plan to increase vac-
cine supply, aims to reduce the global shortage of influenza vacci-
nes and the inequitable access to them. It has three main
objectives:
1. an evidence-based increase in use of seasonal vaccine;
2. an increase in vaccine production capacity and strengthened
national regulatory competencies;
3. research and development of more effective vaccines.
WHO’s regulatory contribution to GAP has two components:
 regulatory activities in support of TTI, a specific WHO initiative
under GAP which, through technology transfer, aimed at estab-
lishing influenza manufacturing capacities in low- and middle-
income countries;
 other indirect regulatory support activities linked to the overall
objectives of the GAP.
4. The A(H1N1) influenza pandemic in 2009–10 and its effect on
the GAP
June 2009 saw the first influenza pandemic of the twenty-first
century, following inter-related outbreaks due to a previously
undetected A(H1N1) virus in North America. The TTI, even in its
early developmental stage, was able to contribute to global immu-
nization efforts, with pandemic vaccines being developed, pro-
duced, and licensed within the framework of the GAP. At the
same time, the pandemic provided an opportunity to review activ-
ities and adjust them to take account of lessons learnt.
In mid-2011, WHO and its partners from national governments,
United Nations agencies, funders, regulatory authorities, non-
governmental organizations, vaccine manufacturers and academic
research held a meeting to review the progress made and lessons
learnt. This meeting aimed to refine the objectives of the GAP
and to provide a roadmap for technical implementation and a sus-
tainable approach to pandemic preparedness. While the primary
objectives of the GAP remained the same, consideration was given
to expanding the Action Plan and incorporating new activities.
In the regulatory area, emphasis was given to improving
national and regional regulatory processes, improving vaccine
deployment capabilities, and creating more responsive post-
marketing monitoring of vaccine effectiveness and safety in order
to allow public concerns to be addressed promptly [16].
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The TTI was launched in February 2007 as a specific project con-
ceived, managed and coordinated by WHO [17] to strengthen pan-
demic influenza preparedness and response. Since then, the TTI has
supported the establishment of influenza vaccine production facil-
ities in low- and middle-income countries by facilitating funding
and technology transfer to eligible vaccine manufacturers. In a
gradual process, grants have been awarded to 14 low- and
middle-income countries to establish in-country manufacturing
capacity for influenza vaccine: Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indone-
sia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Republic of Korea,
Romania, Serbia, South Africa, Thailand and Viet Nam. Financial
support was provided by the Department of Health and Human
Services of the USA, the Government of Japan, the Asian Develop-
ment Bank, the Government of Canada, and the Government of
the United Kingdom [18].
Regulatory support from WHO was at the heart of the TTI pro-
ject from the beginning, targeting both the manufacturers and
NRAs. At the onset of the GAP in 2006, the NRAs of only four of
the 14 grantee countries (Brazil, India, Indonesia and the Republic
of Korea) were assessed by WHO as functional, i.e. met WHO indi-
cators of regulatory functionality for vaccine prequalification. This
means that the following six basic functions established by WHO’s
comprehensive regulatory oversight system for vaccines were in
place and operating at a satisfactory level of quality: (1) market
authorization and licensing activities, (2) monitoring of adverse
effects following immunization, (3) lot release, (4) laboratory
access, (5) regulatory inspections, and (6) authorization and mon-
itoring of clinical trials [19,20].
WHO activities to strengthen NRAs in support of TTI have been
based on a four-step process:
(1) gap analysis through assessment of the strengths and weak-
nesses of the targeted regulatory functions;Table 1
Functionality of NRAs in countries receiving grants through the GAP/TTI programme (200
WHO region GAP country
Africa South Africa
Americas Brazil, Mexico
Eastern Mediterranean Egypt, Islamic Republic of Iran
Europe Serbia, Romania, Kazakhstan
South-East Asia India, Indonesia, Thailand
Western Pacific China, Republic of Korea, Viet Nam
Total
Table 2
WHO prequalified pandemic influenza vaccines for the 2009–10 pandemic.
Name Company
Arepanrix GlaxoSmithKline Biologica
Panvax CSL Limited
Fluvirin-H1N1 Novartis Vaccines and Dia
Focetria Novartis
Celtura Novartis
Pandemrix GlaxoSmithKline Biologica
Panenza Sanofi Pasteur
Influenza A (H1N1) 2009 monovalent vaccine Sanofi Pasteur
Influenza A (H1N1) 2009 monovalent vaccine MedImmune
Green Flu-S Green Cross Corp.b
Humenza Sanofi Pasteur
a Country received support through GAP/TTI.
b Manufacturer received grant under GAP/TTI.(2) planning for addressing the identified gaps, through the
establishment of an institutional development plan (IDP);
(3) addressing gaps through technical support and training
(courses on vaccine quality [21], in-country workshops,
on-site technical support and consultations);
(4) monitoring progress and the impact of training through reg-
ular follow-up of the IDP and formal, on-site reassessment
(leading in some cases to the granting of functional status).
Significant progress has been made in regulatory preparedness
in these countries. As of May 2016, ten of the 14 NRAs (71%) met
the indicators of regulatory functionality for vaccine prequalifica-
tion (Table 1), compared with four in 2006.
The attainment of regulatory functionality by anNRAmeans that
vaccinemanufacturers in the same country can submit applications
forWHOprequalification of seasonal or pandemic influenza vaccine
for which they have secured in-country market authorization.
Of the 14 TTI manufacturers, five currently have newly licensed
vaccines (India, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Romania and Thai-
land); other grantees have vaccines in an advanced stage of clinical
development.
Four manufacturers, from Brazil, India, Indonesia and the
Republic of Korea, have received market authorizations for their
newly developed seasonal vaccine. Two such vaccines, produced
by the Green Cross Corporation (Republic of Korea) and the Serum
Institute of India, received WHO prequalification status in 2011
and 2015, respectively. Five domestic NRAs (Brazil, India, Republic
of Korea, Romania and Thailand), four of which are now fully func-
tional according to WHO standards, granted market authorization
for monovalent A(H1N1) pandemic vaccines developed by grantee
manufacturers. Three of these vaccines (from India, Republic of
Korea and Romania) were used to vaccinate people during the
2009–10 influenza pandemic, when close to 20 million such vacci-
nes were distributed. The pandemic product from the Republic of
Korea was prequalified in 2010, and the Indian live attenuated pan-
demic vaccine in 2012.6–2016). Source: Dr. C. Alfonso (WHO).
NRA functional
2006 2016
Brazil Brazil, Mexico
Egypt, Islamic Republic of Iran
India, Indonesia India, Indonesia, Thailand
Republic of Korea China, Republic of Korea, Viet Nam
4/14 (29%) 10/14 (71%)
Country of production Date of prequalification
ls Canada 19 November 2009
Australia 1 December 2009
gnostics United Kingdom 9 December 2009
Italy 16 December 2009
Germany 17 December 2009
ls Germany 21 December 2009
France 22 January 2010
USA 27 January 2010
USA 25 February 2010
Republic of Koreaa 11 May 2010
France 5 July 2010
Table 3
WHO prequalified seasonal influenza vaccines (2009–2016).
Name Vaccine type Company Country of production Year of prequalification
FluLaval Split virion inactivated GlaxoSmithKline Biologicals North America Canada 2009
Fluvirin Subunit inactivated Novartis Vaccines and Diagnostics United Kingdom 2009
Fluzone Split virion inactivated Sanofi Pasteur USA 2010
GC FLU & GC FLU Multi Split virion inactivated Green Cross Corp.b Republic of Koreaa 2011 & 2012
Vaxigrip Split virion inactivated Sanofi Pasteur France 2011
Influenza Vaccine Split virion inactivated Hualan Biological Chinaa 2015
Nasovac-S Live attenuated Serum Institute of Indiab Indiaa 2015
Fluzone Quadrivalent Split virion inactivated Sanofi Pasteur USA 2015
a Country received support through GAP/TTI.
b Manufacturer received grant under GAP/TTI.
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nes that received WHO prequalification status during the A
(H1N1) pandemic in 2009/10, and all the seasonal vaccines which
have been prequalified since 2009, including those supported
through the GAP TTI.
6. Influenza vaccines and the WHO vaccine prequalification
programme
Before 2006, influenza vaccines were not included in the WHO
vaccine prequalification programme. It is therefore all the more
remarkable that two pandemic and two seasonal vaccines devel-
oped under the GAP TTI received WHO prequalification status in
such a short time. This could not have happened without a strate-
gic adaptation of the prequalification programme to the evolving
pandemic threat of the A(H5N1) virus during the mid-2000s.
The WHO vaccine prequalification programme was established
in 1987, as a service to United Nations procurement agencies to
ensure that vaccines supplied through these agencies for use in
national immunization programmes are consistently safe and
effective. As the programme developed and gained recognition, it
became more and more a reference to other purchasing agencies
and self-procuring countries [19,20]. Public health authorities in
countries that lack a strong regulatory system frequently use pre-
qualification by WHO as a safeguard when procuring vaccines.
Once a vaccine has been granted prequalification status, it
enters the post-prequalification monitoring phase of the pro-
gramme, which aims to provide reassurance that the quality of
the prequalified product is maintained. The monitoring incudes
targeted lot testing, follow-up of complaints from the field and
periodic reassessment of the prequalification status. The frequency
and scope of reassessment for a particular vaccine are based on risk
analysis [20,22]. As a response to the emerging demand in 2006
and 2009, an expedited assessment procedure was developed
and implemented for seasonal and pandemic influenza vaccines
submitted for prequalification, respectively. The specific treatment
of these products was justified by the overwhelming urgency of the
complex epidemiological situation with A(H5N1) and A(H1N1)
influenza.
From the viewpoint of GAP, timely prequalification of influenza
vaccines was particularly important. United Nations procurers only
accept WHO prequalified vaccines, and 75% of the countries that
received donated A(H1N1) vaccines during the WHO Pandemic
Vaccine Deployment Initiative in 2010 required WHO prequalifica-
tion as part of national registration or exemption from it. The
remaining 25% of countries did not have an NRA or were unable
to review information and provide specific authorization. In such
cases, WHO prequalification was the sole basis for authorizing
in-country distribution and use of vaccine [23].
As the pandemic virus started transitioning towards a seasonal
pattern, the Director-General of WHO announced the end of the
pandemic on 10 August 2010. Up to that date, eleven pandemicvaccines had received WHO prequalification status, many of them
in record time (Table 2).
Between November 2009 and May 2016, eight seasonal influ-
enza vaccines from six manufacturers were prequalified. Two of
the companies were TTI grantees; and in 2015 a third product from
another low- and middle income country, China, where the domes-
tic NRA received regulatory support through GAP, also received
WHO prequalification status (Table 3). Interest in influenza vaccine
prequalification remained high among vaccine manufacturers as
five new applications were submitted for review in 2014–15, and
additional products are in the pipeline for 2016.
7. Lessons learnt from the WHO Pandemic Influenza A(H1N1)
Vaccine Deployment Initiative – regulatory aspects
Following the declaration of the A(H1N1) pandemic in June
2009, WHO immediately called for solidarity in enabling fair access
to effective vaccines. To ensure that developing countries were
able to protect their populations, WHO began mobilizing and coor-
dinating the donation of resources needed to deploy pandemic vac-
cines to some of the world’s most vulnerable populations.
Accordingly, the WHO Pandemic Influenza A(H1N1) Vaccine
Deployment Initiative was established as the first coordinated glo-
bal response to an influenza pandemic, bringing together support
from governments, philanthropic foundations and vaccine manu-
facturers. Through the Initiative, an unprecedented number of
newly produced pandemic vaccines were distributed around the
globe. Countries that did not produce influenza vaccines and were
unable to purchase them on the commercial market were eligible
for donations. More than 78 million doses of pandemic vaccine
were distributed to 77 eligible countries, together with appropriate
ancillary devices, such as syringes and safety boxes. While this
unprecedented volume of distribution is impressive and had a
great global impact, it should be noted that there were in fact
signed agreements with donors for more than 122 million doses
[23].
In line with the established practices of United Nations procur-
ers, only nationally licensed and WHO prequalified vaccines were
accepted as donations. The expedited review procedure developed
by theWHO prequalification unit permitted a much shorter assess-
ment time than the usual 12–24 months. Consequently, by the end
of January 2010, eight monovalent pandemic A(H1N1) vaccines
had received prequalification status, including all the products
used in the WHO Deployment Initiative [24].
The regulatory contribution of WHO to the Deployment Initia-
tive was twofold. In addition to the timely prequalification of pan-
demic vaccines, WHO also supported national registration of
pandemic vaccines offered for donation. An evaluation of the main
operational lessons learnt from the Initiative was carried out in
December 2010 in Geneva, with the participation of more than
50 representatives from donor and recipient governments, interna-
tional organizations and vaccine manufacturers. It was concluded
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national registration – unless the country’s laws stated that prod-
ucts donated by the United Nations did not require registration –
WHO prequalification alone was insufficient to secure prompt
acceptance and use of the vaccines. Regulatory obstacles, clearly,
were not the only limiting factors: in certain instances poor com-
munication among partners, inadequate transport facilities, com-
plicated donation logistics and lack of preparedness also limited
the impact of the Initiative [25].
The evaluation meeting made the following recommendations
in the area of regulatory support: (1) promote acceptance of
WHO prequalified vaccines by NRAs in countries to reduce delays
due to country-specific registration and other regulatory issues;
(2) clarify the roles and responsibilities of NRAs in countries using
donated vaccines (in an emergency); (3) encourage manufacturers
to prequalify more seasonal vaccines; (4) investigate whether pro-
visional licences in countries of manufacture would have an impact
on the overall regulatory process for later conversion to full
licences on production of the actual pandemic vaccine [25].8. Regulatory capacity-building under the WHO Pandemic
Influenza Preparedness (PIP) Framework
Preparedness for the next influenza pandemic, as a potentially
major global health security issue, has remained a high priority
for WHO and its Member States since the relatively mild A
(H1N1) pandemic in 2009–10. The adoption of resolution
WHA64.5 by the World Health Assembly in 2011 (Pandemic influ-
enza preparedness: sharing of influenza viruses and access to vac-
cines and other benefits) recognized the importance of planning
and capacity-strengthening [26,27]. The PIP Framework, estab-
lished by WHO in 2007, is a multifaceted programme, complemen-
tary to the GAP. Contrary to the vaccine focused objectives of the
GAP, the PIP Framework is directed at generic preparedness,
capacity-building (such as laboratory facilities and surveillance),
burden of disease studies, regulatory systems, and risk communi-
cation [28].
Since 2013, the extended regulatory portfolio of the PIP Frame-
work covers three areas of activity, which are complementary to
the direct regulatory support provided by WHO under TTI:
 development of guidelines for non-vaccine-producing countries
that will enable them to expedite approval of influenza vaccines
used in national immunization programmes;
 capacity-strengthening of NRAs in 16 low- and middle-income
countries to regulate influenza products, including vaccines,
with a focus on marketing authorization and pharmacovigilance
– the two regulatory functions deemed essential for countries
that procure vaccines through United Nations agencies; and
 development of a common approach for accelerated regulatory
approval of influenza products in a public health emergency
through encouraging 48 target countries to adopt a collabora-
tive procedure developed by WHO to assess and accelerate
national registration of WHO prequalified pharmaceutical prod-
ucts, including vaccines, which can be considered as a response
to the problems experienced in recipient countries during the
Pandemic Influenza Vaccine Deployment Initiative.
9. Conclusion
During the past 10 years, the international public health com-
munity has been rightly concerned about global ability to respond
to influenza pandemics. The concern has arisen, in part, from the
re-emergence of the A(H5N1) virus in humans in 2003, the
2009–10 A(H1N1) pandemic, which spread with great speed anddisrupted social and economic life around the world, and the emer-
gence of A(H7N9) avian influenza in humans in 2013.
Around the mid-2000s, multifaceted national, regional, supra-
national (European Union), and international efforts were imple-
mented aimed at preparing for the next pandemic; these
inevitably included vaccine regulation. Many of the then existing
regulations had been in place for decades and were in need of revi-
sion. In addition, new, innovative pathways were developed aimed
at paving the way to a more flexible, consensus-led regulatory
environment that could contribute to timely licensing of pandemic
vaccines produced rapidly and in large quantities, with concomi-
tant reassurance about vaccine safety. WHO has played a leading
catalytic role in promoting convergence in the field of influenza
vaccine regulation. As the virus continues to evolve and to pose
new challenges, the need for further regulatory development will
remain with us for the foreseeable future [29,30].
The valuable regulatory support provided by WHO, which was
intensified during and after the 2009–10 pandemic, contributed
significantly to the GAP’s success. Global regulatory support for
pandemic influenza vaccines remains vitally important, particu-
larly in the context of the recent focus on the need for equitable
access to quality-assured medicines and health products. The cru-
cial role played by WHO in strengthening national regulatory sys-
tems and promoting equitable access to good quality, safe,
effective and affordable medicines was recognized in 2014 by the
World Health Assembly in resolution WHA67.20 (Regulatory sys-
tem strengthening for medical products) [31]. The resolution
requested that WHO ‘‘continue to support Member States upon
their request in the area of regulatory system strengthening”. It
also requested the Director-General of WHO to report in due
course to the Health Assembly on progress in the implementation
of the resolution.
The GAP was originally launched in 2006 as a ten-year project.
However, the need for regulatory system strengthening remains
high and resolution WHA67.20 makes it likely that WHO will con-
tinue to give regulatory support to new manufacturers and their
regulators, as well as to regulators in non-vaccine-producing
developing countries.
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